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ENRON, TITANIC, AND THE PERFECT STORM*
Nancy B. Rapoport**
[Former Enron CEO Jeffrey] Skilling offered a hypothesis for what
brought Enron down, calling it a "perfect storm" of events.
He speculated that questions raised about the quality of Enron's
accounting and about self-dealing caused a loss of confidence in the
financial community. That led to Enron's debt being downgraded.
That downgrade, he said he was told by an Enron executive after
he left, meant Enron couldn't access several billion dollars of back-up
credit lines. A liquidity crunch followed, he said, even though Enron
was solvent and highly profitable.
-Laura Goldberg, Houston Chronicle1
* © Nancy B. Rapoport 2002. All rights reserved.
** Dean and Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center. All views
expressed in this essay are mine alone, and not those of the University of Houston or
its faculty, staff, or administration. I want to thank Emily Chan-Nguyen, Kelli Cline,
Bala Dharan, Susan Evangelist, Patrick Flanagan, Jimmy Halvatzis, Michele Hedges,
Morris & Shirley Rapoport, Harriet Richman, Jeff Van Niel, and Michelle Wu. I also
want to thank the students in my 2002 Seminar on Special Issues in Ethics: Sara
Alonso Oliver, Justin Berg, Alison Chien, Doug Du Bois, Trevor Fish, Patrick
Flanagan (who gets thanked twice, because he was also one of the cite-checkers for
this article), Kim Havel, Cathy Helenhouse, Colin Moore, Sandy Oballe, Kevin
Powers, Barry Rienstra, Ron Smeberg, and Tiffany Toups.
1. Laura Goldberg, Did No Wrong, Skilling Says: Defends His Role in Enron
Fall, Hous. Chron., Jan. 17, 2002, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/
special/enron/decOl/1183520; see also Good Morning America (ABC television
broadcast, Feb. 7, 2002) ("All eyes will be on former CEO Jeff Skilling. Skilling
blames Enron's collapse on an unfortunate collision of events-the perfect storm.
Congressional investigators point out he was at Enron's helm at the time."). Of
course, now everyone-and I mean everyone-has latched onto this "perfect storm"
metaphor. See, e.g., Federal Document Clearing House, Worldcom CEO John
Sidgmore Testifies Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, July 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 1753183, at *3 (statement of John
Sidgmore, CEO, WorldCom) ("Several factors.., converged to create, I'll use Mr.
Legere's words, a kind of perfect storm-and I guarantee you we did not rehearse
this-that ripped through the telecommunications industry."); Federal Document
Clearing House, Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive Litigation,
July 17, 2002, available at 2002 WL 1584492, at *3 (statement of Richard Anderson,
CEO, The Doctor's Company) ("The combination of these factors created.., the
perfect storm ... for medical liability insurers."); Federal Document Clearing House,
House Committee on Education and the Workforce Holds a Hearing on Enron's
Benefits Plan and its Compliance With Laws on Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans,
Feb. 7, 2002, available at 2002 WL 203240, at *12 (statement of Teresa Ghilarducci,
Associate Professor of Economics, University of Notre Dame) ("The 1990s was the
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Of course, we now know the extraordinary combination of
circumstances that existed at that time which you would not meet
again in 100 years; that they should all have existed just on that
particular night shows, of course, that everything was against us.
-Second Officer Charles Lightoller, RMS Titanic'
I had some misgivings about calling [my book] The Perfect Storm,
but in the end I decided that the intent was sufficiently clear. I use
perfect in the meteorological sense: a storm that could not possibly
have been worse.
-Sebastian Junger 3
Much has been written about the Enron fiasco, from scholarly
articles4 to popular books,5 and I'm sure that much more will be
written about the deals that brought the company down, the
arrogance of some of the main players, and the ethical and moral
issues that seemed to come to light only after the story broke in the
media.6 Enron's collapse, along with the failures of such other mega-
businesses as WorldCom and Global Crossing,7 triggered new
perfect storm for pensions to increase."); Federal Document Clearing House, U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Accountability Issues: "Lessons
Learned From Enron's Fall," Feb. 6, 2002, available at 2002 WL 188865, at *11-12
(statement of Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Washington State) ("In
Washington [State,] we feel like Enron has been the gathering of the perfect storm.
First, they gouged our consumers and rate payers with highly questionable power
prices last year. And now, sadly, they have defrauded our investors and others across
the nation.").
2. Walter Lord, The Night Lives On 47 (1987) [hereinafter The Night Lives On].
3. Sebastian Junger, The Perfect Storm: A True Story of Men Against the Sea
xiv (1997).
4. See, e.g., Michelle Chan-Fishel, After Enron: How Accounting and SEC
Reform Can Promote Corporate Accountability While Restoring Public Confidence, 32
Envtl. L. Rep. 10965 (2002); Timothy P. Duane, Regulation's Rationale: Learning
from the California Energy Crisis, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 471 (2002); Marisa Rogoway,
Recent Developments, Proposed Reforms to the Regulation of 401(k) Plans in the
Wake of the Enron Disaster, 6 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 423 (2002); Marissa P.
Viccaro, Can Regulation Fair Disclosure Survive the Aftermath of Enron?, 40 Duq. L.
Rev. 695 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Dirk J. Barreveld, The Enron Collapse: Creative Accounting, Wrong
Economics or Criminal Acts? A Look into the Root Causes of the Largest
Bankruptcy in U.S. History (2002); Robert Bryce, Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego, and the
Death of Enron (2002); Loren Fox, Enron: The Rise and Fall (2002); Peter C. Fusaro
& Ross M. Miller, What Went Wrong at Enron: Everyone's Guide to the Largest
Bankruptcy in U.S. History (2002).
6. One of the reasons that I'm sure more will be written is that I'm working on
such a project: Enron: Corporate Fiascos & Legal Implications (with Bala G. Dharan)
(work in progress).
7. Take a look at the largest bankruptcies, in terms of approximate stated
liabilities, in the past twelve months: WorldCom (7/02 bankruptcy filing) ($43 billion,
including $2 billion more in liabilities discovered after the bankruptcy filing); Enron
(12/01) ($32 billion); NTL, Inc. (5/02) ($23.4 billion); Adelphia (6/02) ($18.6 billion);
Global Crossing (1/02) ($12.4 billion); KMart (1/02) ($10.2 billion). See American
Bankruptcy Institute, A Look Inside the Mega-Case, 10th Annual Southwest
Bankruptcy Conference, Sept. 12-15, 2002; Bill Atkinson, Kmart Files Chapter 11
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legislation' and introduced such heretofore arcane acronyms as
"SPEs" into the general lexicon.9 The metaphor most used to
describe Enron's quick descent into chapter 11 has been "the perfect
storm."
That "perfect storm" metaphor irks me to no end. I maintain, and
this essay is designed to illustrate, that what brought Enron down-at
least as far as we know-wasn't a once-in-a-lifetime alignment of
elements beyond its control. Rather, Enron's demise was a synergistic
combination of human errors and hubris: a "Titanic"'" miscalculation,
rather than a "perfect storm."'"
Bankruptcy; No. 3 Discounter Cites Weak Economy, Tough Competition; 'Couldn't
Pay the Bills'; Swift Move Surprises; $2 Billion Loan to Aid Firm's Reorganization,
Bait. Sun, Jan. 23, 2002, at IA ("The Troy, Mich.-based firm listed $17 billion in assets
and $11.3 billion in liabilities .... [a]lthough Kmart's bankruptcy is large, it pales in
comparison to the largest bankruptcy in history, filed last month by Enron Corp...
[which] listed $49 billion in assets and $31.2 billion in debts."); Julie Creswell, Going
For Broke; Crash! There Goes Another Company into Bankruptcy. How Did We Get
Here? (Long Story.) Are We on the Mend? (Don't Bet on It.), Fortune, Feb. 18, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 2190302; Lorrie Grant, Discounter Hopes for Fast
Reorganization, USA Today, Jan. 23, 2002, at B02 ("Kmart listed $16.28 billion in
assets and $10.34 billion in debts."); Andrew Leckey, Bankruptcies Leave Investors in
the Lurch, Chi. Trib., Aug. 27, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2689322; Alexandra R.
Moses, Chern Yeh Kwok, & Thomas Lee, Retailer Kmart Files for Bankruptcy;
Officials Plan to Close Some Stores, Reorganize, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan. 23,
2002, at Al ("[Kmart] has $10.25 billion in debt."); Chris Reidy, Kmart Tumbles
Discount Retail Chain in Record Chap. 11 Filing, Boston Globe, Jan. 23, 2002, at C1
("In its bankruptcy filing, Kmart and its US subsidiaries listed $17 billion in total
assets at book value and total liabilities of $11.3 billion as of the quarter ended Oct.
31."); Gary Young, Major Bankruptcies Filed in New York City, 228 N.Y. L.J. 5 (Aug.
1, 2002).
8. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745,
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 800 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1348, 1514A, 1519-20) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley];
Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through
Improvement of Oversight of the Auditing Process, 67 Fed. Reg. 44964-01 (proposed
July 5, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 229).
9. If you don't believe me, just do a search in WESTLAW or LEXIS on "SPEs"
and see how many documents you get, especially documents dated after October
2001, when the Enron disaster began to break. A search of major newspaper articles
(Westlaw database NPMJ) for the terms "special purpose entity" or "special purpose
entities" during the year 1999 yielded zero results. The first article in this database
appeared in October 2001 and a search of 2002 now yields over 328 results (as of the
second week in October 2002, with more being added daily).
10. And, no, it wasn't the Leonardo DiCaprio movie (Titanic (20" Century Fox
1997)) that first piqued my interest in the ship's history. I've been fascinated by it for
probably thirty or so years. Among other things, I'm a member of the Titanic
Historical Society, and I probably own virtually every book and movie about the ship.
If you're wondering if I'm a bit obsessed with the ship and its tale, you're right. But
everyone needs a hobby.
11. I've used the Titanic comparison once before. See, e.g., Mike Tolson, The Fall
of Enronl'Convenient whipping boy'/Enron Scandal Offers Fodder for Wide Range of
Groups Seeking a Symbol for Their Cause, Hous. Chron., Mar. 3, 2002, at 26, available
at 2002 WL 3245488. Others have also made the comparison between Enron and the
Titanic. See Edward J. Cleary, Lessons For Lawyers From The Enron Debacle, Bench
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I. WHY TITANIC IS A BETTER METAPHOR FOR ENRON'S EVENTUAL
DOWNFALL THAN IS THE PERFECT STORM
The story of the Titanic is well-known. The ship was, at the time of
its maiden (and only) transatlantic voyage, the largest in the world,
carrying a microcosm of society. 2 The glitterati of the United States
and Europe were on board, as were hundreds of immigrants trying to
make their way to a new land. The ship was built with watertight
compartments that extended from the keel up several decks (some to
D Deck and some to E deck); she also had a double bottom for extra
protection.13 She was designed to float with any two consecutive
compartments flooded and even with three of the first five
compartments (out of 16) flooded, 4 thanks to electronic doors that
could be closed by a single command. 5 And she was touted as
"unsinkable," at least in some press reports. 6
But sink she did, based upon a series of miscalculations, no single
one of which might have proved fatal, but all of which, taken together,
doomed the ship. In a chapter of his follow-up book to A Night to
Remember, called The Night Lives On,7 Walter Lord enumerates the
many individual mistakes made that night:
* the calm sea, which meant that the lookouts couldn't see any
waves breaking against the bergs;'
* the numerous, apparently ignored ice warnings from ships
already crossing the Atlantic Ocean using the same route as
the Titanic;
* the lack of any systematic procedure to deliver ice and
weather warnings from the Marconi telegraph room to the
bridge;2"
* the fact that the lookouts' binoculars had been lost earlier in
the trip;2'
& B. Minn., Apr. 2002, at 16 (footnotes omitted) (quoting George F. Will,
"Indignation Over Enron is Just the Beginning," Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 2002) ("Given
that Enron employee pensions were decimated with, as one commentator noted, the
employees "locked in steerage like the lower orders on the Titanic," and given that
many state pension funds were among the casualties, both state and national public
officials will be forced to act."); Martha Neil, Partners at Risk, 88 A.B.A. J. 44 (Aug.
2002) ("The collapse of Enron might give partners at law firms reason to ponder
another epic disaster: the sinking of the Titanic.").
12. Walter Lord, A Night to Remember 1 (1997) [hereinafter A Night to
Remember].
13. Id. at 174-75. She did not, however, have a double hull. Id.
14. Id. at 26.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 175.
17. The Night Lives On, supra note 2.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 48-53.
20. Id. at 53.
21. Id. at 60.
1376 [Vol. 71
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" the failure of the Titanic's officers to urge Captain Smith (or
each other) to take a more cautious approach to travel,
based on the calm sea and rapidly dropping temperature; 2
* not enough lifeboats for the number of souls aboard;23
* Captain Smith's failure to hold lifeboat drills 24 or to do more
than a perfunctory test of the ship's braking speed and
maneuverability; 25
* First Wireless Operator Phillips's famous response to an ice
warning from the Californian (the ship that, according to
some accounts, was closest to the Titanic when it sunk),
"Shut up, shut up... I am working Cape Race"; 26
* the fact that lookout Frederic Fleet spotted the berg too late
to stop the ship or otherwise to avoid the berg;27
* First Officer Murdoch's decision to port around the berg
rather than ramming it head-on, a counterintuitive action
that might have saved the ship;28 and
" the Californian's decision not to come to the aid of a vessel
in enough obvious distress to fire white distress rockets
(apparently visible to the Californian's crew) at several
intervals.29
The list of miscalculations goes on and on.3 But Walter Lord tells it
best:
Given the competitive pressures of the North Atlantic run, the
chances taken, the lack of experience with ships of such immense
size, the haphazard procedures of the wireless room, the casualness
of the bridge, and the misassessment of what speed was safe, it's
remarkable that the Titanic steamed for two hours and ten minutes
through ice-infested waters without coming to grief any sooner.
"Everything was against us?" The wonder is that she lasted as long
as she did.3'
The Perfect Storm, on the other hand, describes a combination of
meteorological bad luck and human miscalculation, born less of
arrogance than of desperation. Granted, Billy Tyne, captain of the
Andrea Gail, made a fatal mistake by sailing into the storm,32 but he
22. Id. at 53-54.
23. Id. at 72-80.
24. A Night To Remember, supra note 12, at 42.
25. The Night Lives On, supra note 2, at 56.
26. Id. at 58.
27. Id. at 59-60.
28. Id. at 59.
29. Id. at 134-59.
30. And I have done so at some social gatherings, as my very indulgent husband
can attest.
31. The Night Lives On, supra note 2, at 61.
32. Special thanks to Boyd Henderson for reminding me, at a luncheon, that some
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did "what ninety percent of us would've done-he battened down the
hatches and hung on. '33 Although the signs were clear that bad
weather was coming, the sheer magnitude of the storm was far beyond
the experience (or imagination) of any of the ship captains in the large
area covered by the storm, and each of them had to make a quick
decision:
[The weather bulletin describing Hurricane Grace] reads like an
inventory of things fishermen don't want to hear.... Every boat in
the swordfish fleet receives this information. Albert Johnston, south
of the Tail, decides to head northwest into the cold water of the
Labrador Current.... The rest of the sword fleet stays far to the
east, waiting to see what the storm does. They couldn't make it into
port in time anyway. The Contship Holland, a hundred miles south
of Billy, heads straight into the teeth of the thing. Two hundred
miles east .... the Liberian-registered Zarah, also heads for New
York. Ray Leonard on the sloop Sartori has decided not to head for
port; he holds to a southerly course for Bermuda. The Laurie Dawn
8 keeps plowing out to the fishing grounds and the Eishin Maru 78,
150 miles due south of Sable Island, makes for Halifax harbor to the
northeast. Billy can either waste several days trying to get out of the
way, or he can stay on-course for home. The fact that he has a hold
full of fish, and not enough ice, must figure into his decision.34
Billy Tyne's decision proved wrong, and the Andrea Gail lost all six
hands aboard .3 Titanic lost over 1,500 souls, with only 705 saved.36
Both events were tragic. But only the Titanic can trace the loss of life
directly to human arrogance.37 When I compare the two tragedies in
light of Jeffrey Skilling's claim that the fall of Enron was based on
factors outside of the company's control-an economic "perfect
storm"-I find that Skilling's claim falls flat.
II. HOW A FAILURE OF CHARACTER CAN TURN "PERFECT
STORMS" INTO TITANIC MISTAKES
I'm not going to rehash the mechanics of the various Enron deals
here. Others have done a good job of describing the problems with
the deals,38 with the Board's lack of oversight of the deals,39 and with
human error contributed to the fate of the Andrea Gail.
33. Junger, supra note 3, at 124 (quoting Captain Tommie Barrie, of the ship
Allison).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 186.
36. A Night to Remember, supra note 12, at 176.
37. The Golden Age's love of, and faith in, science contributed to the tragedy as
well, as some of the miscalculations that Captain Smith made were based on the
scientific advances in ship design.
38. See, e.g., William C. Powers, Jr., Raymond S. Troubh & Herbert S. Winokur,
Jr., Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of
Directors of Enron Corp., 2002 WL 198018 (CORPSCAN 1980818 (ENRON))
[hereinafter Powers Report]. The Powers Report is also available at
1378 [Vol. 71
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the general culture of Enron that encouraged aggressive risk-taking
and short-term profits."' We obviously don't know enough about the
deals or the people yet to reach any final conclusions, so my
comments are going to concentrate on one theme -character. If we
are to believe that there is a single root cause of the Enron mess (an
arguable point at best in such a complicated situation), failure of
character gets my nomination.
Character and leadership are inextricably linked.41 When the
leaders are engaging in self-dealing and side deals,42 and the
supervisors of those leaders are also engaging in side deals,43 and the
gatekeepers are approving those side deals," what should the rank
and file be thinking? Given the magnitude of the potentially illegal
http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2002/LAW/02/02/enron.report/powers.report.pdf. There is also a
lot of good Congressional testimony on the subject. See, e.g., Federal Document
Clearing House, Strengthening Accounting Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, June 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL 1381127 (statement of Bala G.
Dharan, Howard Creekmore Professor of Management, Rice University); Federal
Document Clearing House, U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Holds a
Hearing on the Collapse of Houston-based Enron Corporation, Jan. 24, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 93421 (statement of John Langbein, Professor of Law, Yale University
Law School); Federal Document Clearing House, Deregulating Capital Markets,
Outline of the Testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Commerce Committee, Nov. 14, 1995,
available at 2002 WL 1381127 (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolphe Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia University).
39. See Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong., The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's
Collapse, July 8, 2002, available at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/senatel2lpl07.html [hereinafter Senate Print].
40. See, e.g., Tom Fowler, The Pride and the Fall of Enron, Hous. Chron., Oct. 20,
2002, at A25 [hereinafter The Pride and the Fall] ("[One manager, told that a deal
would take a year, said,] 'I haven't got a year. If I can't do it in three months I won't
do it because my bonus depends on it"' since "bonuses were based on the total value
of the deal, not the cash it brought in."); Greg Hassell, The Fall of Enron/The
Culture/Pressure Cooker Finally Exploded, Hous. Chron., Dec. 9, 2001, at 1.
41. Mary C. Daly, Panel Discussion on Enron: What Went Wrong?, 8 Fordham J.
Corp. & Fin. L. 1, S28 (2002) ("What the literature teaches is that the ethical behavior
is taught from the top down .... It is management's commitment to ethical standards
that sets the tone.").
42. The self-dealing by former Enron CFO Andrew Fastow was, apparently,
approved by Enron's Board of Directors when the Board waived its ethics rules
(more than once) to allow Fastow to head two partnerships that would be negotiating
with Enron. See, e.g., Letter from Max Hendrick, III, Vinson & Elkins, to James V.
Derrick, Jr., Enron, [Re: Preliminary Investigation of Allegations of an Anonymous
Employee] (Oct. 15, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1764266 (CORPSCAN); see also
Senate Print, supra note 39, at 23-24; Powers Report, supra note 38, at *68-71.
43. The Enron Board apparently had several directors who also had consulting
agreements with Enron, enabling a form of double-dipping. See Senate Print, supra
note 39, at 51-55.
44. See Powers Report, supra note 38, at *10 ("There was an absence of forceful
and effective oversight by Senior Enron Management and in-house counsel, and
objective and critical professional advice by outside counsel at Vinson & Elkins, or
auditors at Andersen.").
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profits made by CFO Andrew Fastow and CEO Jeffrey Skilling,45 and
the sense of entitlement that Enron encouraged," it must have taken
significant strength of character to resist getting on that gravy train.
And yet, several people did resist. Who resisted, and why?
By now, those following the Enron case know that Sherron Watkins
tried to alert CEO Kenneth Lay to serious concerns that she had
about Enron's deals:
Shortly after Enron announced Skilling's unexpected resignation on
August 14, 2001, Watkins sent a one-page anonymous letter to Lay.
The letter stated that "Enron has been very aggressive in its
accounting-most notably the Raptor transactions." The letter
raised serious questions concerning the accounting treatment and
economic substance of the Raptor transactions (and transactions
between Enron and Condor Trust, a subsidiary of Whitewing
Associates), identifying several of the matters discussed in this
Report. It concluded that "1 am incredibly nervous that we will
implode in a wave of accounting scandals." Lay told us that he
viewed the letter as thoughtfully written and alarming.47
45. Fastow Charged With Fraud, Conspiracy in Enron Case, Wash. Post, Oct. 3,
2002, at A01; April Witt & Peter Behr, Dream Job Turns Into a Nightmare; Skilling's
Success Came at High Price, Wash. Post, July 29, 2002, at A01; see also Senate Print,
supra note 39, at 24, 34-36; Powers Report, supra note 38, at *3, 10.
46.
Enron employees who mastered the art of trading and deal-making could
earn fantastic sums. Annual bonuses were as high as $1 million. Shortly
after each bonus time, a new crop of silver Porsches-the most favored
status symbol at Enron-would appear in the company garage.
"I remember one trader going crazy because his bonus was only $500,000.
He was cursing and screaming and throwing things at his desk," one former
Enron employee recalls. "He thought because he was so brilliant, they
should be paying him a lot more."
Hassell, supra note 40, at 1.
47. Powers Report, supra note 38, at 79. Note the new standards of behavior
imposed on company attorneys by Sarbanes-Oxley:
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall issue rules, in the public interest and for the protection of
investors, setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for
attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in any way in the
representation of issuers, including a rule-
(1) requiring an attorney to report evidence of a material violation of
securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company
or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer
of the company (or the equivalent thereof); and
(2) if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence
(adopting, as necessary, appropriate remedial measures or sanctions with
respect to the violation), requiring the attorney to report the evidence to the
audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.
Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 8, at § 307; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (West Supp. 2002).
After a whole slew of parties filed objections to the SEC's Proposed Rule regarding
attorney conduct (with many of the objections focused on the "noisy withdrawal"
1380 [Vol. 71
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Watkins later told Lay that she had written the letter and met with
him regarding her concerns.4" Lay referred the matter to Enron's
General Counsel, James Derrick, a former Vinson & Elkins partner. 9
Derrick in turn asked Vinson & Elkins, one of Enron's key outside
law firms, to conduct a preliminary review of the situation-but not to
review the underlying transactions that Watkins had discussed in her
letter."' Within the confines of Derrick's request, Vinson & Elkins
conducted an investigation (interviewing Watkins, among others).
V&E concluded that "none of the individuals interviewed could
identify any transaction between Enron and LJM that was not
reasonable from Enron's standpoint or that was contrary to Enron's
best interests." On the accounting issues, V&E said that both Enron
and Andersen acknowledge[d] "that the accounting treatment on
the Condor/Whitewing and Raptor transactions is creative and
aggressive, but no one has reason to believe that it is inappropriate
from a technical standpoint." V&E concluded that the facts revealed
in its preliminary investigation did not warrant a "further
widespread investigation by independent counsel or auditors,"
although they did note that the "bad cosmetics" of the Raptor
related-party transactions, coupled with the poor performance of the
assets placed in the Raptor vehicles, created "a serious risk of
adverse publicity and litigation.
'51
One observation: Vinson & Elkins's undertaking of the
investigation had certain restrictions, including Enron's request not to
review the bona fides of the underlying transactions.52 We don't know
what sort of give and take occurred between Enron and Vinson &
Elkins about the usefulness of such a request.53 At some point, thanks
provisions of the Proposed Rule, see http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml),
the SEC has apparently abandoned the "noisy withdrawal" provision in its final rule,
see http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-13.htm. As of this writing, I have only seen
the press release regarding the final rule, not the actual text of the rule.
The days of taking an issue only partially up the chain of command are over,
at least for publicly traded companies. But haven't lawyers always had the
responsibility of taking matters all the way up the chain of command? See Model
Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13. 1 wonder whether Ms. Watkins, as an accountant,
had a similar duty under her profession's ethics rules. If she did have such a duty, and
she didn't go all the way to the board of directors with her concerns, was she really a
whistleblower?
48. Powers Report, supra note 38, at *79.
49. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Anderson: Called to Account: Enron Lawyers Face
Congress Over Their Role, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 2002, at C13 (noting that Derrick used
to be a partner at Vinson & Elkins).
50. Powers Report, supra note 38, at *79.
51. Id. at *80.
52. Id. at *79. "The result of the V&E review was largely predetermined by the
scope and nature of the investigation and the process employed.... The scope and
process of the investigation appear to have been structured with less skepticism than
was needed to see through these particularly complex transactions." Id. at *81
(footnote omitted).
53. Jordan Mintz, Enron Global Finance's General Counsel, has stated that
1381
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to the ability of Enron's chapter 11 management to waive the
attorney-client privilege, 54 we may learn more. But I have to admit,
right off the bat, that I have a hard time believing that Vinson &
Elkins, or any of Enron's other law firms, advised Enron to do
anything that was clearly illegal. The real issue is how Enron handled
the grey areas of the law, based on the advice of all of its lawyers
Vinson & Elkins "fulfilled its professional duties" in terms of the advice it gave to
Enron. Laura Goldberg, Enron's Words as Relevant as Deeds/Reports May Have
Told Partial Truths, Hous. Chron., Feb. 11, 2002, at 1. I'm not yet ready to get on the
bandwagon that denounces all of Enron's lawyers. Because of Vinson & Elkins's ties
to Enron's General Counsel James Derrick, though, Mintz hired a separate firm,
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, to review the deals of which Watkins had
complained. Rone Tempest, Enron Counsel Warned About Partnerships Probe:
Company's Legal Executive Asked Opinion of Law Firm in April. Congressional
Investigators Say It Was to 'Halt This Practice,' L.A. Times, Jan. 31, 2002, at Cl.
54. The principal case involving privilege in the bankruptcy context is, of course,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985)
("[W]e hold that the trustee of a corporation in [a chapter 7] bankruptcy has the
power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to pre-
bankruptcy communications."). Weintraub answered the question of how much
control a chapter 7 trustee had over the corporation's attorney-client privilege. Id.
Subsequent cases have answered the question about how far the Weintraub holding
could go in a chapter 11 context. See, e.g., Am. Metrocomm Corp. v. Duane Morris &
Heckscher LLP, 274 B.R. 641, 654-56 (Bankr. D. Dela. 2002) (stating that debtor-in-
possession controls attorney-client privilege, and debtor-in-possession can request
documents from attorneys even if attorneys raise work product privilege as a
defense); In re Bame, 251 B.R. 367, 370, 374 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (converting
chapter 11 case to chapter 7 case; holding that chapter 7 trustee can access the post-
petition, pre-conversion communications between the debtor-in-possession and its
lawyers because the privilege is held by the estate, and not by the debtor-in-
possession); Whyte v. Williams (In re Williams), 152 B.R. 123, 129 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1992) ("The liquidating trustee [under a confirmed chapter 11 plan] controls the
power to waive or invoke the evidentiary privileges that arise in connection with the
causes of action transferred to the liquidating trust under Article 25.5 of the
confirmed plan."); see also S. Air Transp., Inc. v. SAT Group, Inc., 255 B.R. 706, 711
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2000) (citations omitted).
The Court agrees that a corporate fiduciary is precluded from asserting
privileges to protect his own interests that are adverse to those of the
corporation. Corporate officers must "exercise the privilege in a manner
consistent with their fiduciary capacity to act in the best interests of the
corporation and not of themselves individually."
Id. The interesting part about the privilege issue in the Enron bankruptcy context is
whether Steve Cooper (the restructuring expert currently running Enron) is going to
waive the privilege in order to get information from the various law firms that
represented Enron and then, if the information gives rise to a cause of action against
any of Enron's lawyers, use that very information to pursue them in bankruptcy court.
Mr. Cooper can also pursue Enron's officers and directors using that privileged
information, as the privilege belongs to the client (Enron) and not to any of the
client's employees. I've been following the work of the Severed Enron Employees
Coalition in the pursuit of the prepetition bonuses paid to certain Enron executives
on the theory that the bonuses were fraudulent conveyances. Severed Enron
Employees Coalition v. N. Trust Co., No. 02-0267 (S.D. Tex. complaint filed Jan. 24,
2002). Any privileged advice, on the order of "Should we pay this person a retention
bonus? What will we get in terms of a benefit for the retention bonus?" could be
helpful in this regard.
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(both its in-house and outside counsel).
Watkins wasn't the lone voice questioning Enron's deals; others,
including Enron Global Finance's General Counsel Jordan Mintz,
were concerned about the structure and disclosure of the various
deals." Apparently, Fastow and Skilling didn't brook disagreement
willingly. Those who objected often found themselves the subject of
pressure, downright abuse, and exile.56
I'd like to put forward one striking similarity between the Titanic
and Enron: a failure of meaningful communication stemming from a
belief that someone else had "taken care of it." Here's how a recent
newspaper article describes the problem:
"[S]ince most only saw their part of the business, they assumed the
problems were isolated .... 'You understood your piece of the
business and maybe what the guy next to you did, but very few
understood the big picture.... That segmentation allowed us to get
work done very quickly, but it isolated that institutional knowledge
into the hands of very few people."' 57
Certainly, the Powers Report describes the failure of follow-
through regarding several of the Enron deals-the failure to ascertain
if the checks and balances, supposedly part of each deal's structure,
were in place and working. 8 As John Coffee explains,
55. See, e.g., Senate Print, supra note 39, at 28 n.81 (quoting an internal
memorandum from Mintz):
[T]he Company needs to improve both the process it follows in executing
such transactions and implement improved procedures regarding written
substantiation supporting and memorializing the Enron/LJM
transactions .... [F]irst is the need for the Company to implement a more
active and systematic effort in pursuing non-LJM sales alternatives before
approaching LJM...; the second is to... impose a more rigorous testing of
the fairness and benefits realized by Enron in transacting with LJM.
Id.; see also Dan Feldstein, Skilling Says He Did No Wrong/ Lawyer Told Not to Stick
Neck Out, Hous. Chron., Feb. 8, 2002, at 1 (describing how Fastow tried to bully
Mintz into blessing irregularities in certain Enron deals).
56. See, e.g., The Pride and the Fall, supra note 40, at 27A (listing three people-
Andersen partner Carl Bass, former Enron CFO (after Fastow) Jeff McMahon, and
former Merrill Lynch analyst John Olson-who were demoted (Olson was fired) after
criticizing the aggressive Enron deals and accounting methods); see also Editorial
Desk, Not Quite a Whistle-Blower, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 2002, at A20; Andy Geller, "I
Believe Mr. Skilling and Mr. Fastow Duped Mr. Lay"-Enron VP Rips Duo Before
Congress, N.Y. Post, Feb. 15, 2002, at 9; Susan Schmidt, CEO Was 'Misserved' At
Enron, Hill Told; Former Executive Blames Other Top Managers, Wash. Post, Feb. 15,
2002, at A01; Peter Spiegel, The Architect of Enron's Downfall: Internal Probe
Reveals Andy Fastow as a CFO who Bullied Staff and Even Wall Street Banks,
Enriching Himself by More than Dollars 45m in the Process, Fin. Times, May 21, 2002,
at A20.
57. See, e.g., The Pride and the Fall, supra note 40, at 27A. Remember that those
"very few people" included members of the Board of Directors, which waived
Enron's ethics rules more than once to allow self-dealing by some of Enron's
executives. See supra note 42.
58. See Powers Report, supra note 38, at *18-28.
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Enron... furnish[es] ample evidence of a systematic governance
failure. Although other spectacular securities frauds have been
discovered from time to time over recent decades, they have not
generally disturbed the overall market. In contrast, Enron has
clearly roiled the market and created a new investor demand for
transparency. Behind this disruption lies the market's discovery that
it cannot rely upon the professional gatekeepers-auditors, analysts,
and others-whom the market has long trusted to filter, verify and
assess complicated financial information. Properly understood,
Enron is a demonstration of gatekeeper failure, and the question it
most sharply poses is how this failure should be rectified.59
Failures of gatekeeper professionals aren't new. The savings and loan
crisis, which also represented a significant gatekeeper failure,
occurred a mere twenty years ago;" the Salomon Brothers Treasury
bonds trading scandal occurred just ten years ago. 1
It's certainly possible that many of the legal and accounting
professionals (the in-house and the outside professionals) who advised
Enron assumed that Enron's own businesspeople were doing the
follow-through; moreover, many of those same professionals may well
have thought that it was not the lawyers' or accountants' "place" to
bill Enron for continued checks of the system. (I know nothing about
the training of accountants, so I'm going to limit the rest of this
discussion to the training of lawyers.) If the lawyers saw themselves as
59. John Coffee, Understanding Enron: It's All About the Gatekeepers, Stupid
(manuscript at 6, on file with author) (footnote omitted).
60. Now that I wear bifocals, twenty years just doesn't seem that long ago.
61. Daly, supra note 41, at S25-S28; Federal Document Clearing House, U.S.
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Holds A Hearing on
Enron Bankruptcy, Dec. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 1623334 (statement of John
Coffee, Professor of Law, Columbia University) ("Well, when a debacle like Enron
occurs, the critical question for Congress and for regulators is to ask, as you've been
beginning to ask, where were the gatekeepers; where were the watchdogs? ... Here,
all failed, and all failed fairly abysmally.").
The fallout from [the savings and loan] scandal included a Justice
Department action against the prestigious New York firm of Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler. Kaye, Scholer and partner Peter Fishbein were
said to have gone beyond mere aggressive lawyering, and more than one
observer viewed their representation as akin to aiding and abetting, while
others attributed any errors to simple inattentiveness. Ultimately, the case
was settled, with the firm and its malpractice carrier paying $41 million in
settlement, and the Keating lawyers paid for their alleged sins,
notwithstanding their ability to spread the loss to other lawyers via
malpractice insurance coverage.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Embracing Descent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigm for
Conceptualizing and Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 25, 111-12
(1999) (footnotes omitted). For a wonderful discussion of the Kaye, Scholer firm and
the savings and loan crisis, see David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1147 (1993). As Clarence Darrow
apparently said, "History repeats itself, and that's one of the things that's wrong with
history." The Quotations Home Page, at http://www.geocities.com/-spanoudi/topic-
h3.html#history.
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morally independent from Enron, rather than morally interdependent,
then they might well have believed that it was Enron's job, not theirs,
to ensure follow-through. A more complex explanation is that
cognitive dissonance-well-documented in social science literature
and applied to lawyers by, among others, David Luban-prevented
the lawyers from seeing some of these deals more clearly. My hunch
is that both concepts-a mistaken belief in moral independence,
rather than interdependence, and the effects of cognitive dissonance-
played a part in any failures by the gatekeepers.
A. "Moral Independence" Versus "Moral Interdependence" as an
Explanation
For the longest time, lawyers have done everything they could to
distinguish the client's ends from the means that the lawyers used to
achieve those ends. This "moral independence" theory has been used
to justify everything from lawyers who take on unpopular causes to
lawyers who facilitate shady deals, even though the original theory
was never intended to justify shady deals.62
Several scholars have recognized, though, that the complexity of
modern legal practice forces lawyers to take a more active role in
shaping not just the clients' advice but the clients' deals and litigation
as well.63 This "moral interdependence" theory of the lawyer-client
62. According to a study by Erwin Smigel, lawyers'
independence derived from two sources. First, "they... 'represent' the law
and must therefore separate themselves from the client." Second, the
commodity they sold was "[i]ndependent legal opinion." Smigel observed
that "client[s] desire that a firm maintain its autonomy" so that they can
obtain the best advice. Moreover, as the large firms grew older, they
increased their number of clients and moved away from fundamentally
relying on one or a few clients. This shift "strengthened... a firm's ability to
retain its independence" because "no one client provid[es] enough income
to materially or consciously influence the law office's legal opinion."
Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Formation and
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 381, 406 (2001) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Governing Class]
(quoting Erwin 0. Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer: Professional Organization Man?
(1964)).
The fun part about the history of the bar's independence theory is its link with
the robber barons of yesteryear. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Profession as a
Moral Teacher, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 195, 222-23 (1986) [hereinafter Moral Teacher];
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 Vand. L.
Rev. 697, 703-04 (1988). As Russell Pearce points out,
In becoming hired guns, elite lawyers abandoned the traditional governing
class ideology. They were no longer acting as a disinterested political
leadership capable of discerning and pursuing the common good. Instead,
they were advocates of private interests. They had violated professionalism's
taboo on acting as a servant of big business and could no longer claim the
special tie to the public good which distinguished them from those in
business.
Pearce, Governing Class, supra, at 400-10.
63. Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
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interaction is a more realistic view of the lawyer's modern role,
especially when it comes to complex transactions or complexlitigation.'4
When you overlay the lawyer's moral interdependence on top of a
cutthroat culture, you get Enron (and WorldCom, and Tyco, etc.).
We still don't know a lot of the facts behind Enron's various deals,
including what the various lawyers said, Enron's response to that
advice, or how much the accountants' advice contradicted (or
supported) the lawyers' advice. But we do know that the structure of
Enron itself encouraged a constant pushing of the outside of the
envelope.65  Enron encouraged a "me, first" structure, not a
cooperative one.
"Enron sought to redefine the rules of the industry," said Robert
Bruner, a professor at the University of Virginia who has made a
case study of Enron's culture. "It was a culture of challenge and
confrontation."
[Former CEO Jeffrey] Skilling also is responsible, many insiders say,
for creating a mercenary, cutthroat culture to stoke the fires beneath
the enterprise. One of the hallmarks of the Skilling regime was a
performance review process that employees called "rank and yank."
The evaluations compared the performance of employees against
one another, with the bottom 15 percent getting axed every year.
The evaluations were done by asking employees to judge others'
performance. They did so knowing their own promotions and
survival hung in the balance.
"Because of that, you never helped one another," said one former
Enron employee. "Everyone was in it for themselves. People
stabbed you in the back."
Teamwork, once a source of strength, started to disappear.
Their Clients, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 507, 511, 544-45 (1994); see also id. at 526 ("Joint
decisionmaking by lawyer and client has become both efficient and prudent."
(footnote omitted)).
64. For example, the Powers Report points out that, with respect to preparing the
various disclosure forms that Enron filed, "[w]hile accountants took the lead in
preparing the financial statement footnote disclosures, lawyers played a more central
role in preparing the proxy statements, including the disclosures of the related-party
transactions." Powers Report, supra note 38, at 84. This interdependence is by no
means limited to the lawyers who worked on Enron's deals. See Governing Class,
supra note 62, at 408-09 (citing Robert A. Kagan and Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social
Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 399 (1985) and Robert L.
Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy. Social Values and Client
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (1985)). Both the Kagan &
Rosen study and the Nelson study are well worth reading.
65. 1 first read this phrase in Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff 12 (1979).
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"It was every man for himself," a former Enron executive said.
What sense of teamwork survived "rank and yank" was undermined
by Enron's reward system, which seemed to place no value on group
goals but lavishly rewarded individual accomplishment. An
employee who could close big deals got big bonuses and promotions.
Those who couldn't were shown the door.
Let's take this moral interdependence theory one step further. Add
to the theory (1) Enron's culture and (2) the personality traits of a
large number of lawyers (whether or not they ever had Enron as a
client), and you have a disaster just waiting to happen. Susan Daicoff
has summarized the literature on lawyers' personality traits quite
nicely in a series of articles.67  Lawyers tend to have certain
personality characteristics that contribute to their need to "win."
They "appear to be more competitive, aggressive, and achievement-
oriented, and overwhelmingly Thinkers (instead of Feelers)....
Lawyers are more often motivated by a need for achievement than are
others, which includes a need to compete against an internal or
external standard of intelligence."'  No matter which way you slice it,
these gatekeepers were too closely involved with their client 69 to be
able to stand up and say, "You shouldn't do that." At some point, we
need lawyers to say, "'The law lets you do it, but don't.... It's a rotten
thing to do."'7
B. Cognitive Dissonance as an Explanation
Even if the gatekeepers weren't so closely involved with the client,
there's yet another reason for their failure to protest the deals that
were on (or over) the edge: cognitive dissonance. My sociologist
friends7 tell me that moral development alone-which is an individual
trait-can't explain how an individual will react to a particular
66. Hassell, supra note 40. For a masterful compendium of the theories
surrounding community norms in monitoring and shaping the roles of lawyers, see W.
Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in
Professional Communities, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1955 (2001) [hereinafter, Social Norms].
67. See, e.g., Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself- A Review of Empirical
Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 1337
(1997) [hereinafter Know Thyself/j; Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical
Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 Fla. L. Rev. 197, 217-18 (1996).
68. Know Thyself, supra note 67, at 1408-09 (footnotes omitted). According to
Daicoff, law students come into law school hard-wired with these traits. Id. at 1349-50.
Imagine my relief at knowing that law school didn't "ruin" them.
69. See, e.g., supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
70. Sol M. Linowitz, Moment of Truth for the Legal Profession, Address at the
University of Wisconsin Law School (Oct. 24, 1997), in 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 1211, 1214-
15 ("I believe Elihu Root once again had it exactly right when he told a client: "The
law let[s] you do it, but don't.... It's a rotten thing to do.").
71. Special thanks go to Julia McQuillan, who guided me through the literature
and theories in her field.
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situation.72  The situation itself will interact with the traits of the
individual, and both the person's individual traits and his situation will
affect an outcome.73
Peer pressure is one such particular influence. There are some well-
regarded studies showing that even relatively obvious physical
conclusions, such as the distance from one point to another or the
length of a line, can become subject to "groupthink," placing peer
pressure on the unbelieving minority to conform to the wrong-headed
thinking of the majority.74 And if hard-wired concepts, such as size
and location, are manipulable by the particulars of the situation, what
about the fuzzier concept of behavior?
Stanley Milgram's studies on the willingness of experimental
subjects to inflict pain (electrical shocks) on complete strangers can
give us a glimpse into how powerful the effect of a particular situation
can be. In Milgram's best-known study, the actual subject was asked
to give a series of progressively more severe shocks to someone who
was posing as a fellow experimental subject. Although the actual
subject usually agonized about administering the shocks, he went
ahead and administered them nonetheless. 75
In analyzing Milgram's experiment, Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett
concluded that the powerful structure of the situation-the authority
figure setup; the calm tones of the experimenter standing next to the
subject who was administrating the shocks; the experimenter's
repetition of the phrases, "The experiment requires that you continue;
you have no choice"-served to overcome the subjects' expressed
desire to stop the experiment before reaching the "severe shock"
stage. Most of the subjects were stymied by uncertainty and couldn't
72. Cf Julia McQuillan & Julie Pfeiffer, Why Anne Makes us Dizzy: Reading
Anne of Green Gables from a Gender Perspective, 16 Mosaic 34/2, June 2001, at 19
("In an attempt to explain variation within sex categories, sociologists have argued
that external social structures (our actual experiences in the world) organize our
behavior more than socialization (how we've been told to behave).").
73. The thought that moral development alone can predict a person's behavior
without regard to the particular situation is called the "fundamental attribution
error." See David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in Ethics in Practice:
Lawyers' Roles, Responsibilities, and Regulation 94, 101 (Deborah L. Rhode ed.,
2000) [hereinafter Wrongful Obedience]; see also Lee M. Johnson, Rehan Mullick, &
Charles L. Mulford, General Versus Specific Victim Blaming, 142 J. of Soc. Psychol.
249 (Apr. 2002) ("The fundamental attribution error occurs when individuals
overemphasize personal attributes and discount environmental attributes in their
judgments of others"); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings:
Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 Advances in Experimental Social Psych.
173 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977). See generally David C. Funder, Personality
Judgment: A Realistic Approach to Personal Perception (1999).
74. Lee Ross & Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situations: Perspectives of
Social Psychology 30 (1991) ("Our most basic perceptions and judgments about the
world are socially conditioned and dictated." (citing Sherif's "autokinetic effect"
studies and Asch's "comparison lines" studies)).
75. Id. at 56-57.
76. One of Milgram's later variations on the study involved changing the setting
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overcome the social pressure of the situation. It's not that the subjects
were sadists. But the structure of the situation prevented them from
acting on their own reluctance to continue the shocks.
David Luban has also described the Milgram experiment and has
pointed out that almost two-thirds of the subjects in Milgram's
experiments actually did go all the way to 450 volts.77 He posits that a
"corruption of judgment" stemming from cognitive dissonance caused
two-thirds of the subjects of Milgram's experiments to "kill" the
learner:
[T]he key to understanding Milgram compliance lies in features of
the experimental situation.... The teacher moves up the scale of
shocks by 15-volt increments, and reaches the 450-volt level only at
the thirtieth shock. Among other things, this means that the
subjects never confront the question "Should I administer a 330-volt
shock to the learner?" The question is "Should I administer a 330-
volt shock to the learner given that I've just administered a 315-volt
shock?" It seems clear that the latter question is much harder to
answer....
Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that when our actions conflict
with our self-concept, our beliefs and attitudes change until the
conflict is removed.... Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that
when I have given the learner a series of electrical shocks, I simply
won't view giving the next shock as a wrongful act, because I won't
admit to myself that the previous shocks were wrong.78
Luban's most important point is that lawyers aren't immune to the
effects of cognitive dissonance. He does a masterful job of linking the
Berkey Photo-Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.79 case and Stanley Milgram's
experiments on obedience to explain how very well-intentioned
lawyers can find themselves slipping into serious breaches of ethics.
For those who aren't familiar with this case, Brad Wendel describes it
nicely:
The lawyers representing Kodak had retained an economist as an
expert witness, expecting that he would testify that Kodak's
domination of the market was due to its superior technological
innovations, not to anticompetitive behavior. The plaintiff's counsel
requested any documents pertinent to the expert's testimony,
Kodak's lawyer's resisted, and ultimately a magistrate ordered
production of numerous documents including interim reports
prepared by the economist. At the economist's deposition, one of
from Yale to an inner-city, run-down, suspicious-looking lab in another town. See id.
at 55. He recorded approximately the same results, no matter the setting.
77. Wrongful Obedience, supra note 73, at 97 ("In reality, 63 percent of subjects
complied all the way to 450 volts. Moreover, this is a robust result: it holds in groups
of women as well as men, and experimenters obtained comparable results in Holland,
Spain, Italy, Australia, South Africa, Germany, and Jordan .. " (footnote omitted)).
78. Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted).
79. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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Kodak's lawyers stated that he had destroyed the interim reports,
which were somewhat unfavorable to Kodak's defense. The lawyer
even filed an affidavit in a subsequent discovery dispute in the case,
stating under oath that the documents had been destroyed. In fact,
the lawyer had not destroyed the documents, but had hidden them in
his office and withheld them from production. The affidavit was
perjurous. The fallout was a calamity for the firm. Kodak fired it
and hired one of its arch-rivals to defend the antitrust case. The firm
paid its client over $600,000 to settle Kodak's claims related to its
conduct of the litigation. It lost Kodak's business, which had
accounted for approximately one-fourth of the firm's billings and
had employed thirty lawyers full-time. The partner who had
coordinated the firm's preparation of the economist's testimony was
released from the firm and spent twenty-seven days in jail for
contempt of court.8s
In his discussion of the Berkey-Kodak case, Luban relates the
following episode:
Joseph Fortenberry, the associate working for [Mahlon Perkins, the
partner representing Kodak], knew that Perkins was perjuring
himself and whispered a warning to him; but when Perkins ignored
the warning, Fortenberry did nothing further to correct his
misstatements. "What happened" recalls another associate, "was
that he saw Perkins lie and really couldn't believe it. And he just
had no idea what to do. I mean, he... kept thinking there must be a
reason. Besides, what do you do? The guy was his boss and a great
guy! ",8l
Fortenberry's comments highlight how fledgling lawyers will take
many social cues from those more experienced lawyers whom they
respect. s2 Of course, the pressure that the senior lawyers take to keep
80. W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement,
52 S.C. L. Rev. 557, 606-07 (2001.) (footnotes omitted); see also Walter Kiechell III,
The Strange Case of Kodak's Lawyers, Fortune, May 8, 1978, at 188. If I were a
superstitious sort, I'd worry about the fact that one of the two "smoking guns" in the
case was Exhibit 666. Id. I am not making this up.
81. Wrongful Obedience, supra note 73, at 95 (footnotes omitted).
82. Cognitive dissonance isn't limited to outside counsel. In a study of inside
counsel, Hugh and Sally Gunz found that the lawyers' advice was not always
independent from the direction that the company itself intended to go:
From a practitioner standpoint, the model highlights issues surrounding the
nature of the advice that organizations can expect to obtain from their in-
house counsel when placed in positions of ethical conflict. In our original
study of OPC [organizational professional conflict], we suggested that an
important implication of our findings was that in-house counsel might not
necessarily always provide disinterested professional advice. In their
different ways, the Technician and Organization Person might produce
superficially helpful advice, which could, under certain circumstances, be
dangerously misleading. The Technician, for example, may deliver clever but
myopic solutions, and the Observer could well misjudge a situation and
remain silent inappropriately. But the Advisor, by avoiding the "cop" aspect
of the Lawyer role (in the sense that there is no implication that he or she
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their clients, maintain their billings, and compete with other elite
lawyers who are all too happy to steal clients away, is relentless
pressure indeed. But if the more senior lawyers can't withstand the
pressure, then who will teach the fledgling lawyers to resist?
III. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
If we want lawyers to spend more time understanding themselves
and their relationship to their clients, then we're going to have to lead
from the top, with judges, partners, bar associations, and other senior
lawyers all singing the same tune. It won't be sufficient for law
professors to warn students against the temptations and pressures of
law practice. As a matter of fact, it's depressing how little influence
law professors have on their students' understanding of legal ethics.
Larry Hellman's study on cognitive dissonance in a legal ethics class
is proof of the need to have top lawyers do the preaching, not law
professors.83 Hellman asked the students in his ethics course to keep
diaries of possible ethics violations that they observed while working
for lawyers during the semester, and those students recounted bad
lawyering in an astonishing variety of forms-neglect, incompetence,
conflicts of interest, and the like.84 If we want to train newly minted
lawyers to be ethical, it's just not enough for law professors to talk the
talk. We must join forces with the lawyers and judges in the "real
world," those who can walk the walk.
Lawyers need to behave as true counselors to their clients, rather
than as hired guns who are just following orders. Society needs us to
take on the role of the social conscience (or, if that sounds too darn
highfallutin', the role of the grease that helps society run). As David
Luban has pointed out,
If lawyers have special responsibilities to legal justice, that is not
because they are divinely elected, or better and holier that [sic] the
rest of us. It is because of how their role fits into an entire division
of social labor. Lawyers represent private parties before public
institutions, or advise private parties about the requirements of
intends to report the situation to the next level higher within the
organization, or to a regulator outside the organization), stays closer to the
Lawyer's advice. So the model, as revised, suggests an even greater variety
of potential responses than in its initial L[awyer], T[echnician], and
O[bserver] form, underlining yet more firmly the need to avoid making
simplistic assumptions about the nature of the advice in-house counsel
provide their employer[s].
Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer's Response to Organizational
Professional Conflict. An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House
Counsel, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 241,279-80 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
83. Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of
Law Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 Geo. J.
Legal Ethics 537 (1991).
84. Id. at 601-05.
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public norms, or reduce private transactions to a publicly-prescribed
form, or ratify that transactions are in compliance with public norms.
To say that they have special duties of fidelity to those norms is no
more ecstatic and supernatural than saying that food-preparers have
heightened duties to ensure their hands are clean. It is their social
role, not the brush of angels' wings on their foreheads, that requires
[food service workers] to wash their hands every time they go to the
bathroom. 5
We used to be better at setting good examples, or so I've heard. In
the "golden days" that Tom Shaffer recounts, some of the lawyers that
he observed set wonderful examples for their newly minted lawyer
colleagues. In my favorite article of his, The Profession as a Moral
Teacher, he tells story after story of lawyers who did the right thing. 6
The constant choice of ethical over unethical behavior helped mold
the lawyer that Shaffer eventually became:
[Those two partners in my former law firm] were philosophically
and temperamentally different and ... practiced law in different
ways. That they were so much alike in these moral matters said
something about their personal character, of course, but, in view of
their personal differences, it also said something about the way the
firm practiced law-about the way the firm functioned as the
profession (for me) and, as the profession, functioned (for me) as a
moral teacher. It was not, that is, an apprenticeship, in which I was
learning my craft, and the morals of my craft, from a master-or at
least it didn't seem, then, that it was. It was the profession (the law
firm) that was the moral teacher .... It was even more like the
moral formation a person gets from family, town, and church. Which
is to say that, here, code depended on character.87
From his experience as a young lawyer, Shaffer took the moral
lesson that a lawyer should also be a gentleman. 8' Tom Shaffer's view
of the "gentlemanly" lawyer, of course, has its critics, 9 including
85. David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 839, 849-50
(1999).
86. Moral Teacher, supra note 62, at 214-17.
87. Id. at 216-17.
88. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Being a Professional Elder, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev.
624, 630-31 (1987) [hereinafter Professional Elder] ("When character is in place,
fortified by 'a few rules' that have to do with professional craft, the professional
person becomes dependable. Professional character is the connection between virtue
and craft. The convention has been to describe that connection with the word
gentleman." (footnotes omitted)). If you haven't read Tom Shaffer's work on this
topic, you should. For a quick shortcut-not to be confused with reading Shaffer's
work-Leslie Gerber has created a good primer. See Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers
Be Saved? The Theological Legal Ethics of Thomas Shaffer, 10 J.L. & Religion 347
(1994).
89. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Still Not Behaving Like Gentlemen, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev.
809, 810-11 (2001); Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should
Lawyers Change? A Critique Of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by
Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 Geo. J. Legal
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Shaffer himself.9" And yet, we do understand the concept that he's
trying to express:9' that of a lawyer who understands her role in
society as more than just a mere scrivener or functionary, and who
tries always to take the moral high ground.92
What happens when we don't set the right example? We can call
doing the right thing "behaving like gentlemen," or we can use some
other, less "loaded" phrase. If we don't exert some leadership and
emphasize the role of character in the practice of law, some very smart
lawyers will continue to do stupid things, and some clients will
continue to do stupid (or venal) things. Some of these people will
even trot out the hoary (and discredited) old saw that they were "just
following orders."93
Ethics 547, 582-83 (1998); William J. Wernz, Does Professionalism Literature Idealize
the Past and Over-Rate Civility? Is Zeal a Vice or a Cardinal Virtue?, 13 Prof. Law. 1
(2001) (disputing the claim that "back then"-whenever "then" was-lawyers were
more professional and more civil).
90. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10 Queen's L.J. 1,
11 (1984).
The 19th century gentleman in North America gave us slavery, Manifest
Destiny, the theft of half of Mexico, the subjugation of women, the
exploitation of immigrant children, Pinkerton detectives, yellow-dog
contracts, and the implacable genocide of American Indians. You could
make a case ... that the gentleman's ethic is not worth taking seriously. If
the gentleman has left the professions, the best thing for us would be to bar
the door lest he get back in.
Id.; see also Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal
Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 Gonz. L. Rev. 393, 400
(1991); Professional Elder, supra note 88, at 633-34.
91. Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., in Praise of a Gentle Soul, Remarks at the
Annual Banquet of the Journal of Law and Religion (Oct. 14, 1993), in 10 J.L. &
Religion 279, 284 (1993/1994).
The acid test of [Tom Shaffer's] reliance on the ethics of gentlemen is
whether it, too, is not flawed at its core. Is it not by definition limited to
males, and does it have any space for minorities? Only one like Shaffer, who
by decades of living like a gentleman himself and reflecting carefully on that
ethic, could have come to the conclusion that the ethic of the gentleman-
lawyer has greater possibilities for the subversion of patriarchy than the
ABA's model of professionalism.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
92. Bill Hodes points out that "[t]he acid test of ethical lawyering is rarely what to
do in the face of crisis-a client shows you the buried bodies or drops a bloody knife
on your desk or commits perjury or destroys or hides material property asked for in
discovery." W. William Hodes, Accepting and Rejecting Clients-The Moral
Autonomy of the Second-to-the-Last Lawyer in Town, 48 U. Kan. L. Rev. 977, 978
(2000) (citing the classic cases of People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 798 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1975) (buried bodies), State v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964) (bloody knife), Nix
v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (perjury), and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (work product)). For a wonderful discussion of
how social norms affect lawyering, see Social Norms, supra note 66.
93. See, e.g., Tom Fowler, Ex-Andersen auditor defended / Aide: Boss was told to
shred files, Hous. Chron., Mar. 7, 2002, at 1 ("An assistant to the Arthur Andersen
lead partner who handled the Enron account said she believes her boss was just
following orders when he told workers to destroy Enron-related documents last
fall."); Marcy Gordon, SEC, Informal Wall Street System Failed to Detect Enron
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So how do we encourage lawyers to withstand peer pressure and
client pressure, especially in those grey areas in which the lawyer gives
advice akin to "it's an aggressive interpretation of the law" and the
client chooses to use that aggressive interpretation, even at the risk of
later litigation? Remember, we're not talking about lawyers who
deliberately counsel clients to flout the law. Rather, we're talking
about lawyers who say that a particular interpretation could go either
in favor of the client or against it.
Personally, I like Russ Pearce's idea that we create a new Model
Rule 1.0. His Model Rule 1.0 would provide that "lawyers are morally
accountable for their conduct as lawyers."94  That rule hits the
question of moral interdependence head on, and it provides a
powerful reminder that "just following orders" is the weakest of
excuses.
95
We can blame part of Enron's downfall on the economy. We can
blame part of it on corporate misbehavior, on board malfeasance, and
on pure greed. We can blame part of it on a structure that allowed
each of the three traditional categories of gatekeepers-the board, the
accountants, and the lawyers-to rely on the other two categories to
understand the overall picture of what Enron was doing. We can even
blame the Enron employees who chose to place too much Enron stock
in their own 401(k) plans, thereby betting twice with the same
money.96 But one thing we can't blame is fate. Enron's collapse
wasn't due to a "perfect storm" of mere coincidence-the collapse
was caused by humans and their hubris. We need to ensure that
Failure, Report Finds, Associated Press Newswires, Oct. 7, 2002, Westlaw,
Allnewsplus Library (Fastow's lawyer contends that his client was just following
orders).
94. Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers are Morally Accountable, 70
Fordham L. Rev. 1805, 1807-08 (2002). Pearce points out that Model Rule 1.0
would not take sides in current disputes regarding the lawyer's role. What it
would do is move the debates regarding the lawyer's moral duties, like that
between Freedman, who favors zealous representation, and Luban, Rhode,
and Simon, who favor some significant limits on that representation, to the
center of the bar's legal ethics conversations. While the bar currently pays
some slight attention to these issues, Model Rule 1.0 would move them to a
more prominent place in the bar's official deliberations and continuing legal
education courses, as well as in the efforts of the conscientious lawyer to
explore her own moral accountability.
Id. at 1808.
95. I'm not sure how one might enforce a Model Rule 1.0, but at least Pearce is
heading in the right direction.
96. See, e.g., Mark Davis, The Fallout of a Fallen Enron; Too Much Company
Stock in 401(k); Plans Poses Risk, Kan. City Star, Jan. 20, 2002, at Al; Kaja
Whitehouse, 401(k) Woes? Might Be Your Own Fault, Dow Jones News Serv., Jan. 18,
2002, Westlaw, Allnewsplus Library. Of course, the freeze on selling stock as the
value of the stock spiraled downward also had something to do with the losses in the
employees' 401 (k) plans. See, e.g., Davis, supra; Editorial, Enron and Frontier Justice
Fear of Angry Workers Sends Energy Trading Firm to New York to File for
Bankruptcy, Portland Oregonian, Dec. 4, 2001, at D06.
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hubris doesn't blind us to the first rule of leadership: It's all about
character.
Notes & Observations
